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National stereotypes are a simplification of certain knowledge, and from this point 
of view they may influence relations between nations and states in a positive or 
negative way. Poles, like other nations, have a stereotype of “an enemy” and “an 
ally” deeply imprinted in their collective consciousness. It is a common, simplified 
and generalised image of other states and their friendly or hostile attitude towards 
one’s own country. 
Poles have some very deeply rooted views on Russia and Germany, resulting from 
historical experience and a relatively high level of knowledge about the situation in 
both of the countries. During the transition period, the way in which the Polish 
public perceived its two most important neighbours, changed significantly. Russia 
was no longer perceived as an important ally of Poland, and that place had been 
quickly taken by the western countries, including Germany. It is worth noting that, 
in spite of the fact that Poland has become deeply integrated into Euroatlantic 
structures, the fears related to Russia have not only failed to diminish, but have 
actually become even stronger. However, both Russia and Germany are placed in 
a closed group of countries with which Poles would like to co-operate in future. 
This may help to improve the negative image of Russia. 
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In a study carried out by the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP), first of all, the following 
question was asked: which countries are perceived by Poles as the allies of Poland 
and which are the countries they fear1. Then, the fears were analysed by asking 
questions related to the main potential threats (political, military and economic), 
and particular issues raising the greatest concern (e.g. the Baltic gas pipeline). 
Finally, a question about possible cooperation was asked. 
 
The “Allies” and the “Enemies” of Poland 
 
On the basis of the spontaneous replies given by Poles to an open question about 
the real allies of Poles, a group of the most important countries may be 
distinguished. They include: USA (33%), Czech Republic(18%), United Kingdom 
(18%) and Germany (17%). If these results are compared to earlier studies, it may 
be noted that between 1990 and 2005 the greatest changes have taken place in 
the perception of Germany, Russia, Czech Republic (see Table1)2. 
                                                 
1
 ISP study “Poland and Germany. Mutual perceptions after Polish accession to the EU” was carried 
out under the patronage of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation in November 2005. Detailed data from that study can be found in the Annex 
at the end of the report.  
2
 See: CBOS, Who can Poland rely on and who should she fear? Study results report, Warsaw, 
November 2004. In the ISP study of November 2005, the same question was asked as an „open” 
question, in which the respondents spontaneously listed the countries they considered to be the 
“allies” or the “enemies” of Poland, without using any list  that could prompt their answers. Therefore 
it seems justified to compare the ISP results with the earlier CBOS results of surveys carried out in 
1990, 1992 and 2004, where the nature and the wording of the question asked were identical. 
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Table 1. The way the allies of Poland are perceived  
 
Having the experience of the past, which 
countries would you count among the real 
allies of Poland? (percentage)* 
February 
1990 
May    
1992 
September 
2004 
November 
2005 
United States of America 23 32 26 33 
Czech Republic (in 1990 and 1992 
Czechoslovakia) 
5 5 7 18 
United Kingdom 10 9 12 18 
Germany 2 7 7 17 
France 16 24 7 12 
Slovakia (in 1990 and 1992 Czechoslovakia) - - 2 6 
Hungary 14 9 5 5 
Russia/USSR 18 4 2 4 
None, Poland has no allies  32 26 25 15 
Difficult to say 10 15 24 16 
Source: Data from 1990, 1992, 2004 – CBOS, 2005 – ISP. 
* In descending order, according to 2005 data 
 
For many years the image of the United States as a real ally of Poland has seemed 
unquestionable. Public support has remained at a similar level: 23% (1990) and 
currently 33% (2005). Since the beginning of transition in 1989, Poles have seen 
the alliance with the USA as a guarantee of their security. In spite of the lack of 
support for the war in Iraq, which is an important project implemented in alliance 
with the USA, the Polish society supports the alliance with the USA. The demands 
to withdraw the Polish troops from Iraq, expressed by the Polish public, do not 
result in the change of the image of USA as our ally. 
As far as other countries are concerned, it is possible to notice significant 
fluctuations of the public opinion over the last fifteen years. The greatest change 
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has been noted in relation to Germany, which in 1990 was pointed to as a real ally 
of Poland only by 2% of respondents, and in 2005 by as many as 17%. Such a 
positive result seems to be an effect of a consistent and active role played by 
Germany in promoting Polish membership in the EU. In spite of historical  
prejudice, Poles seem to notice a number of benefits of a sustainable and long-
term alliance with Germany3. 
A similarly significant change between the 1990 and 2005 can be noticed in the 
perception of the Czech. It is worth noting that the survey was carried out before 
the official visit to Prague of the Polish President Lech Kaczyński. Poles seem to 
appreciate the efforts of their southern neighbour to carry out reforms and free 
market transformation, and seem to count on positive results of cooperation within 
the EU. That would explain the increase between the beginning of the 
transformation (5%) and the year 2005 (18%). A reverse trend has been noted in 
case of Hungary, which can be explained by a generation change and the gradual 
disappearance of the older generation of Poles who remembered the period 
between the world wars and the events of 1956, but also by a limited activity of 
Hungary on the international stage4. 
A similar decrease can be noted in case of Russia – the direct successor of the 
Soviet Union. After the disintegration of the communist block, it became evident 
how unpopular with the public was the People’ Republic propaganda of the close 
Polish-Soviet friendship. In 1990 18% of the respondents perceived the Soviet 
Union as a real ally of Poland. In the following years such a view of Russia was 
held by 2% to 4%. As it can be seen, Poles did not perceive the „Big Brother” as a 
hope for future and a true alliance partner. A number of studies show that the times 
when the communist block existed have been perceived as the era of Soviet 
                                                 
3
 See M. Falkowski, Meinungen der Polen über die polnisch-deutschen Beziehungen nach dem 
Regierungswechsel in beiden Ländern, Eine Meinungsumfrage des ISP, December 2005, 
(www.isp.org.pl). 
4
 See L. Kolarska-Bobinska, J. Kucharczyk, P. Kaczynski (ed.) Bridges across the Atlantic? 
Attitudes of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks towards the United States, Warsaw 2005, p. 37. 
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domination and abuse of Poland5. Since early 1990s Poles have started to place 
their hopes in the NATO, EU and other Member States. 
The results of surveys examining the attitude of the public towards countries 
perceived as a potential threat, lead to important conclusions. As in the previous 
question, the spontaneous replies indicate some interesting changes and trends in 
the public perception over the last sixteen years (See Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. Perception of countries posing a threat to Poland  
 
What are the countries Poland should 
fear most? (percentage)* 
II 1990 V 1992 IX 2004 XI 2005 
Russia/USSR 25 45 44 67 
Germany 88 58 35 21 
Belarus - 3 5 12 
Iraq, “Arab countries”, “Muslim, 
Islamic countries”, “countries where 
terrorism is widespread” 
0 1 18 8 
Ukraine 3 30 5 7 
United States of America 2 2 5 5 
None, Poland has no enemies 3 5 6 5 
Difficult to say 3 8 12 10 
 
Source: Data from 1990, 1992, 2004 – CBOS, 2005 – ISP. 
* In descending order, according to 2005 data. 
 
                                                 
5
 See A. Skorupska, Polska opinia publiczna o Rosji i Rosjanach [in] A. de Lazari (ed.) Polacy i 
Rosjanie – przezwyciężanie uprzedzeń, Łódź 2006. 
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At the beginning of 1990s, the countries that Poles feared most included Germany 
(88%), 25% pointed to the Soviet Union. Other countries did not raise any serious 
concern. After fifteen years, the situation has reversed. In a survey of November 
2005 as many as  67% of respondents saw Russia as the greatest threat, while 
only 21% pointed to Germany. Never before have so many fears been expressed 
in relation to Russia as it is the case now, in 2005. This is not a good indicator for 
the development of Polish-Russian relations. If we look at the replies from different 
years, it can be easily seen that the growth of fears of Russia has been 
accompanied by the decrease in such attitudes towards Germany (see Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1. 
Russia and Germany as countries which Poland should fear most (1990-2005) 
(in %)  
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Source: Data from 1990, 1992, 2004 – CBOS; from 2005 – ISP. 
 
The fear of Germany reflected in the results of a survey in 1990 had been the 
result of the war experience and the nearly fifty years of indoctrination by the 
communist authorities, who kept talking about possible revisionism and imperialist 
threat posed by that country. The prospect of a united and strong Germany raised, 
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therefore, serious concern in the Polish society. The peaceful attitude of Germany 
and its support for democratic changes in Poland convinced the Poles that they 
had nothing to fear from their western neighbour. The decrease in fears was 
noticeable already after two years (58% in 1992). The German active support for 
Polish accession to the EU, in spite of contentious issues in the Polish-German 
dialogue, reappearing from time to time and dominating the public debate, have 
shown the Polish society that Germany may become the main ally and partner of 
Poland in the EU. The generally good cooperation, which from time to time 
stumbled on certain obstacles, has had a positive impact on further reduction of the 
sense of threat from 35% in 2004 to 21% in 2005. 
Unlike in the case of Germany, the Polish fears of the Soviet Union and Russia 
have been gradually growing, in spite of the fact that Poland has been deeply 
rooted in the Euroatlantic structures. It may be the case that the foundations of 
those fears over the last fifteen years have been different. In the early 1990s, a 
potential threat had been the political instability and the lack of certainty where the 
new Russia was going, the growing Mafia structures and a threat of mass 
migration. Since mid 1990s the sustained level of fears has been indicated, 
regarding Russia, which has not been a fully democratic country and whose neo-
imperialism Poles have seemed to fear. Today the threat that Poles see in Russia 
is connected with her growing strength on the international stage, mainly thanks to 
the great energy resources and the military potential (including the nuclear 
capacity). The picture of Russia recovering her influence in Central and Eastern 
Europe, seems to Poles to be more and more likely. The high level of fears, over 
67%, is also the reason why it is worth asking Poles whether they do believe in 
pacts and alliances with the western countries. 
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The sensitive issues in Polish-German-Russian relations 
 
The growing sense of threat related to Russia (from 44% in 2004 to 67% in 2005), 
has been caused not just by the events from a few months ago, that is the hooligan 
excesses in Warsaw and Moscow or the Russian ban on some food imports from 
Poland. The Polish society can see the strength of Russia and the potential threat 
it may pose, mainly in the area of energy security. The Poles realise that when the 
trade in strategic resources is concerned, there may be no room for EU solidarity. 
According to them, the best evidence of that is the position of the German 
government standing firmly by the Baltic gas pipe project.  Over 80% of those 
polled believe that the talks and the agreements between Germany and Russia 
concerning the construction of that gas pipe, held without the participation of 
Poland, should receive a negative assessment. (See Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. What, from the Polish point of view, should be the assessment of the talks and 
agreements between Germany and Russia concerning the Baltic gas pipeline, held without 
the participation of Poland?  
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Source: ISP 
 
 9 
In spite of the fact that Poland is present in the NATO and UE structures and that 
the level of trust towards Germany is on the rise, Poles seem to fear that the 
“demons of the past may be awakened”. When asked whether the closer relations 
between Germany and Russia pose a threat to Poland, nearly 61% replied “yes” 
and over 27% – “no”. Such a result may be explained in two ways: in the economic 
and in the historical dimension. The first one suggests that Poles are afraid of 
economic losses resulting from such an agreement, e.g. taking away the 
intermediary role from Polish companies, or loss of some of the markets. The other 
shows that Poles, in spite of the fact that the international situation has dramatically 
changed, are still concerned that the painful history may repeat itself – they are 
afraid of losing their independence. It may be the case that the internal crises, first 
in the NATO (the dispute over the intervention in Iraq) and then in the European 
Union (the constitution crisis after the “No” vote in the referenda in France and the 
Netherlands) make the Poles believe that both organisations are not very stable 
and that national interests take priority. And those interests, in case of Russia and 
Germany, have often meant subjugating their closest neighbours, including Poland. 
Those results can be briefly summarised as: “nothing about us, without us”. 
 
 
Future image of Germany and Russia 
 
For many Poles, Russia may in future constitute both a military threat (67%), an 
economic threat (62%) and a political one (63%). The fact that there are slightly 
more people afraid of the military threat than the economic and the political ones, 
shows that the rebirth of the Russian military power is stronger perceived in Poland 
than the rebirth of its economic capacity and its political rank. (See Table 3). 
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Table 3. Areas of potential threats from Germany and Russia  
 
military economic political Are you afraid that in 
future Russia/Germany 
may pose a threat to 
Poland: (percentage) 
Russia Germany Russia Germany Russia Germany 
Yes 67 29 62 49 63 33 
No 24 60 29 39 23 50 
Difficult to say 9 11 9 11 14 16 
Source: ISP 
 
Germany does not raise such strong concerns as Russia. Only when asked about 
economic issues, nearly half of the respondents pointed to a possible German 
threat. Poles can clearly see the economic potential of Germany, which the Polish 
companies and the Polish capital have no chance to compete with. 
Bearing in mind the above survey results, it does not seem easy to improve the 
way in which Russia is perceived by the Polish public. However, when asked about 
future cooperation, the respondents surprisingly often pointed to Russia as a 
country with which Poland should cooperate most closely (See Table 4). That 
means that there is certain potential which can play a role in improving the way 
Poles perceive Russia. 
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Table 4. Suggested cooperation of Poland with other countries  
 
In your opinion, which countries 
should Poland cooperate with most 
closely? (percentage)* 
economically politically militarily 
Germany 37 32 21 
Russia 33 18 11 
United States of America 32 43 64 
United Kingdom 23 29 34 
Ukraine 14 7 3 
Czech Republic 12 8 3 
France 10 13 8 
Japan 9 2 2 
Lithuania 4 3 1 
Slovakia 3 4 2 
Difficult to say 8 15 16 
* Respondents selected not more than two countries from the list, results in descending order 
according to data from the first column 
Source: Data from ISP 
 
 
From the list of ten countries, the respondents most often pointed to USA, United 
Kingdom, Germany and Russia as countries with which Poland should cooperate 
in the economic, political and military spheres. As regards economy, Poland should 
first of all cooperate with Germany (37%), and as regards political and military 
issues – with USA (43% and 64% respectively). A significant percentage of 
respondents also suggested the United Kingdom in all of the areas of cooperation 
(22%, 29% and 34%). 
The second most often suggested country for economic cooperation was Russia 
(33%) – in this category selected more often than USA or United Kingdom. The 
high percentage of such replies can be explained by the openness of the Polish 
society to trade with Russia, mainly among farmers and people having their own 
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businesses, who can see a lot of potential benefits and a big chance of achieving 
them. It is probable that a great number of those who supported economic 
cooperation with Russia came from the border regions in the east of Poland – for 
them the matter of trade with Russia seems to be a key issue – yet, on the national 
scale that percentage cannot be so high. 
 
The common belief that economic cooperation with Russia is necessary, indicates 
that Polish public is very pragmatic and that it perceives Russia as a big, ready and 
easy market. In spite of the numerous differences between Poland and Russia: 
different interpretation of history or contradictory geo-political interests, the Poles 
want to cooperate with the Russians. Such a positive attitude of the public, only in 
one sphere – the economy, may in future, with the appropriate contribution on the 
part of politicians, affect the overall perception of Russia. Another very important 
signal from the public is the willingness to cooperate with the Germans not only 
economically but also politically. In view of the current crisis within the EU, this 
seems to be an important message for the Polish government. 
 
 
* * * 
 
The survey has been carried out within the framework of the project “Poland and 
Germany. Mutual perceptions after the Polish accession to the European Union”. It was 
carried out by CBOS between 25 and 28 November 2005, on a randomly selected sample 
of 1005 people over 18 years of age. 
The author is an analyst at the Institute of Public Affairs and a doctoral student at the 
Department of Eastern Studies, Institute of Political Sciences, University of Warsaw. He 
studied political science at M. Lomonosov Moscow State University and at Institut d’Etudes 
Politiques in Strasbourg. He specialises in studies of Russian political elites, relations 
between Russia and the European Union and the theory of democracy. 
